The New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS) was launched in 2008 following more than a decade of policy deliberation on how emission pricing could support New Zealand's contribution to international climate change mitigation efforts. Reflecting the unique emissions and economic profile of New Zealand, New Zealand's regulatory culture, and lessons learned from earlier environmental markets, including within New Zealand, it pioneered many ETS features. Examples include design for coverage of all economic sectors and major greenhouse gases (GHGs); an upstream point of obligation in the energy sectors with opt-in by major downstream users; output-based free allocation to eligible emissions-intensive, trade-exposed activities where the firms involved were not necessarily points of obligation; zero free allocation to energy-sector participants in recognition of the fact that they could pass on emission prices; and a monitoring, reporting and verification system based on self-assessment with audits and penalties to deter non-compliance. From 2008 to mid-2015, the NZ ETS operated without a cap on domestic emissions but instead was nested within the international Kyoto Protocol cap, enabled by buy-and-sell linkages to the Kyoto market. Legislative amendments to moderate the system's impact combined with an oversupply of units in the international market contributed to low domestic emission prices in recent years, and policy uncertainty has obscured the system's long-term price signal. While the NZ ETS may have had a small impact on the forestry sector, officials have found no evidence that it has contributed significantly to domestic mitigation. From 2012 through to mid-2015, participants predominantly met their NZ ETS obligations by purchasing overseas Kyoto units at low cost. The NZ ETS did enable the government to meet New Zealand's international obligations for the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012) with a substantial unit surplus. In 2015, the NZ ETS delinked from the Kyoto market and it currently operates as a domestic-only system. The government is reviewing the system in 2016. The system requires changes to align with New Zealand's Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) under the 2015 Paris Agreement and to effectively support New Zealand's decarbonisation pathway.
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Introduction
When it was introduced in 2008, the NZ ETS was the first emissions trading system in the world designed to cover all sectors of the economy (with phased entry) and the six major GHGs. Over time, the features have been adjusted to reduce the price -and emissions -impact of the system. However, the system has successfully established a functional domestic carbon market and offers a foundation for more ambitious mitigation efforts.
Reflecting New Zealand's distinctive emissions and economic profile (particularly relative to other members of the OECD), its distinctive regulatory culture, and lessons learned from earlier environmental markets in New Zealand and abroad, it pioneered many ETS features. Examples of this include design for coverage of all economic sectors and major GHGs; an upstream point of obligation in the energy sectors with opt-in by major downstream users; output-based free allocation to eligible emissions-intensive, trade-exposed activities where the firms involved
were not necessarily points of obligation; zero free allocation to energy-sector participants in recognition that they could pass on emission prices; and a monitoring, reporting and verification system based on self-assessment with audits and penalties to deter non-compliance.
From 2008 to mid-2015, the NZ ETS operated without a cap on domestic emissions but instead was nested within the international Kyoto Protocol cap, enabled by buy-and-sell linkages to the Kyoto market. These innovations, the reasons they evolved and experience with them, could offer valuable lessons for others creating or reforming ETS in their own distinctive local circumstances.
This paper seeks to build on earlier studies that have reviewed and evaluated aspects of NZ ETS design (e.g. Kerr 2009; Kerr and Chapman 2009; Jiang, Sharp, and Sheng 2009; Bertram and Terry 2010; Cameron 2011; Bullock (2012) ; Mundaca and Richter 2013; Richter and Mundaca 2013; Kerr and Duscha 2014; Richter and Chambers 2014; Afriat et al. 2015 ; Ministry for the Environment 2016; Diaz-Rainey and Tulloch 2016). The paper focuses on the history of the government policy-making process, rather than the significant role played by stakeholders and the experience of NZ ETS participants. 1 It provides updated information on the system design and operation and offers a longer-term perspective on how actual outcomes have compared to expectations that were driven by key assumptions. It also seeks to identify lessons learned from earlier stages of the NZ ETS that can help to inform future policy-making on emissions trading in 1 Many businesses and non-governmental organisations as well as researchers and members of the general public engaged actively during the development of New Zealand's climate change policy and the NZ ETS. Their important contributions, which ranged from technical and economic analysis to social and political influence, and their respective experiences with NZ ETS design and implementation are beyond the scope of this paper. New Zealand and other countries in the evolving context following the 2015 Paris Agreement.
The paper begins with a brief overview of how emissions trading works in New Zealand and then discusses the context for and history of the NZ ETS, summarises key outcomes and assesses some of the lessons learned to date.
More detailed information on the history of the NZ ETS, including key policy milestones, is available through Motu's Timeline for the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (Leining 2016a ) which is available online.
How emissions trading works
Internationally, governments have recognised the necessity and urgency of reducing GHG emissions to avoid dangerous human interference with the climate system. In the 2015 Paris
Agreement, 2 countries agreed to limit temperature rises to well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, and to pursue efforts for a limit of 1.5 degrees Celsius. Achieving this objective will require a global transition to net zero emissions of long-lived GHGs by the end of the century, reductions in short-lived GHGs, and peaking of global emissions in the near term.
Greenhouse gas emissions carry a cost to the environment which traditionally has been ignored in economic transactions, leading to market decisions which do not account effectively for this cost. Putting a price on GHG emissions to incentivise and enable emission reductions has been identified internationally as an important part of global strategy for mitigating climate change (Stern 2007; Garnaut 2008; Garnaut 2011; Nordhaus 2013; Edenhofer et al. 2014 An ETS transforms a regulatory limit on emissions into an emissions price set by the marketplace, enabling and creating economic incentives for producers, consumers and investors to choose lower-emission alternatives without losing competitiveness. Under conventional ETS design, the government imposes a limit (cap) on the total emissions in covered sectors of the economy, and issues a number of tradable emission units equal to the level of the cap. Each unit corresponds to one tonne of emissions. The regulated participants must surrender emission units to cover the emissions for which they are liable. In a domesticonly system (with no offsets or removals), total emissions in capped sectors are no more than the cap.
Participants may receive free emission units from the government (based on some combination of past emissions, output and/or performance standards), earn them for eligible removal activities, purchase them from the government (generating government revenue which 2 See FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, available from https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf.
can be recycled into the economy), or purchase them from other market participants. They may also be able to use domestic or international credits (offsets) or units from other ETSs.
Participants that hold units in excess of their obligation to surrender can sell them or bank them for future use.
The cap on units and establishment of a trading market generate a price on units.
Constraining unit supply relative to demand raises emission prices and reduces emissions.
Mechanisms can be applied to manage emission prices and support market operation. 
Sector coverage and point of obligation
The NZ ETS was designed to cover all sectors of the economy and the six major GHGs 3 over time.
In the 2012 amendments, unit obligations for biological emissions from agriculture were deferred indefinitely but emission reporting obligations were retained, and ETS obligations were replaced with a levy for synthetic GHGs in imported goods. Sectors entered the system as shown in the following table. The point of obligation for ETS reporting and unit obligations was selected for individual sectors in order to support system effectiveness while minimising administrative costs. In the energy sector, for example, the primary point of obligation typically applies upstream at the point of fuel production or import, ensuring broad coverage with the minimum number of ETS participants. However, major users of coal, natural gas, or obligation fuel can opt in as points of obligation, with a carve-out of the upstream obligation (for further discussion of this issue, see Kerr and Duscha [2014] ). In the energy sector, quantity thresholds apply to exclude de minimis sources. In other sectors, the point of obligation applies at the point of emission or removal where feasible, or is assigned to a reasonable proxy such as the point of import or equipment operation. In the agriculture sector, the legislation specifies a processor-level point of obligation for both nitrogenous fertilisers and animals (or animal products), with the option to change to a farmer-level obligation by Order in Council.
The following table summarises 
Unit supply
The government issues New Zealand Units (NZUs) as the primary domestic unit of trade. Each NZU represents one metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (t CO 2 eq). Unit issuance is guided by considerations specified in legislation, including with regard to New Zealand's international climate change obligations and effective operation of the system. To date, NZUs have been issued to satisfy requirements for free allocation (discussed further below) and for eligible removal activities in the forestry and industrial sectors. Under the initial design, each NZU had to be backed by a Kyoto unit, but this requirement was removed (with retrospective application) in the 2012 amendments.
The system was not designed to place its own quantity limit on domestic emissions and does not include a conventional cap. From inception, it was designed to operate nested within the international Kyoto cap, and use the Kyoto market as a major source of unit supply. From 
Unit obligation
The core obligation is for participants to surrender one unit for each tonne of emissions. In the 2009 amendments, this obligation was changed in the stationary energy, liquid fossil fuel and industrial process sectors to a progressive unit obligation under which one unit was surrendered for two tonnes of emissions through December 2012. In the 2012 amendments, the progressive obligation for non-forestry sectors was extended indefinitely and applied to the sectors entering the system in 2013 (waste and synthetic GHGs). In March 2016, the Minister for Climate Change Issues, Hon Paula Bennett, confirmed the government's intention to remove the progressive obligation (Carbon News 2016).
Free allocation
Legislation provides for free allocation to the following sectors: forestry, industrial production, agriculture (once obligations apply), and fishing. Fixed pools of free allocation were provided to the forestry and fishing sectors on the basis of compensation for loss in asset value. Outputbased free allocation is provided annually to eligible trade-exposed and emissions-intensive Other demand was met through the purchase of international units, an option no longer available as of 1 June 2015.
Price management
The NZ ETS was initially introduced with no price cap or floor. In the 2009 amendments, the government added a price cap of NZ$25 per tonne by enabling the fixed-price sale of NZUs with immediate surrender (i.e. with no potential for banking or trading). This was originally intended to apply through the end of 2012, but was extended indefinitely under the 2012 amendments.
Linking
The NZ ETS was conceived as a system with full buy-and-sell linkages to the Kyoto market. The buy linkage with the Kyoto market was subject to some restrictions on unit sources (e.g. nuclear certified emission reductions (CERs), nuclear emission reduction units (ERUs), temporary CERs (tCERs), and long-term CERs (lCERs) were prohibited) but not on unit quantities. Imported assigned amount units (AAUs) were to be excluded unless subsequently provided in regulation.
The government had powers under the legislation to approve or restrict use of overseas units. 
New Zealand's emission reduction commitments
As a Party first to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change In all cases, New Zealand has assumed "responsibility targets" which can be met through a combination of domestic mitigation and investment in overseas mitigation. New Zealand has also adopted the Kyoto Protocol's forestry accounting conventions for Annex I (industrialised)
countries. 10 The following table summarizes New Zealand's emission reduction commitments. 
Initial consideration of emission pricing
Consideration of emissions trading in New Zealand began in the early 1990s (Rive 2011) .
11
Emissions pricing was always a key policy option in New Zealand because it devolves responsibility for (and potentially benefits from) climate mitigation to private markets. In
October 1999, the National-led government identified emissions trading as its preferred policy for the period from 2008 (Hodgson 2005) . During 2001-2002, the Labour-led government consulted broadly on mitigation policy options as part of its deliberation on ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. 12 At the time, the government projected ongoing growth in gross domestic 10 This means that: New Zealand's base-year emissions are calculated excluding forestry, and target-year emissions are calculated including forestry (referred to as "gross-net" accounting); New Zealand accounts for net removals (or emissions) during the target period for post-1989 afforestation/reforestation, and for deforestation of pre-1990 forest; from 2013, New Zealand measures net removals (or emissions) from forest management activities relative to a Forest Management Reference Level representing a projection of business-as-usual activities; from 2013, New Zealand has adopted forestry accounting provisions for harvested wood products (New Zealand Government 2015a; New Zealand Government 2011). 11 Kerr (1995) was written as input to a government working group led by Tim Denne. 12 Research during this period included consideration of the need for additional policies to induce efficient uptake of renewables in the presence of a carbon price (Kerr et al. 2002) . Interestingly, the price assumptions given by government for this report were for a price between NZ$20 and $40 per tonne of CO2 from 2008. • A carbon tax on the energy and industrial sectors approximating the international emissions price but capped at NZ$25 per tonne CO 2 eq, with revenue returned to the economy through the tax system;
• Exemptions from the carbon tax for emissions-intensive and trade-exposed companies that entered into Negotiated Greenhouse Agreements (NGAs) for reducing their emissions;
• An emissions crediting mechanism called "Projects to Reduce Emissions";
• support from its coalition partners, the government decided not to proceed with the carbon tax.
Stages and milestones in NZ ETS policy development
Government policy for the NZ ETS emerged in a series of stages, some of which overlap. These are summarised in Table 5 . Table 6 identifies major milestones in NZ ETS design and implementation. • Shifting the start of unit obligations for the stationary energy, industrial processes and transport sectors to 1 July 2010;
• Deferring unit obligations for biological emissions from agriculture until 2015;
• Introducing a one-for-two unit obligation for non-forestry sectors through 2012;
• Introducing a price cap of NZ$25 per tonne through 2012, which equated to an effective price cap of NZ$12.50 per tonne in non-forestry sectors;
• Changing from a fixed pool to output-based free allocation for industry and agriculture with an extended phase-out; and • Deferring indefinitely unit obligations for biological emissions from agriculture;
• Extending indefinitely the one-for-two unit obligation for non-forestry sectors (extended to include waste and synthetic gases entering in 2013, as well as biological emissions from agriculture at such time as they assumed unit obligations);
• Extending indefinitely the $25 price cap;
• Deferring the phase-out of free allocation in the industry and agriculture sectors until a full unit obligation was in place;
• Removing retrospectively the requirement to "back" NZUs with Kyoto units;
• Introducing forest offsetting for pre-1990 landowners (enabling them to avoid deforestation liabilities by replanting elsewhere) and retaining the second tranche of free allocation for forest owners not participating in offsetting;
• Substituting a levy for synthetic GHGs in imported goods; and
• Providing for discretionary rather than mandatory reviews of the system. Table 7 shows how some of the key legislated changes in 2012 compare to the 2011 recommendations from the review panel. In several notable cases, the government's amendments were less ambitious than the recommendations. As of April 2016, prices were more than NZ$13. 
Patterns of unit surrender
The New Zealand ETS was designed to be fully linked to Kyoto market. Initially this led participants to surrender the cheapest units -NZUs. When prices roughly equalised, participants were indifferent about the type of units they surrendered; they used similar amounts of four types of units. As soon as it became clear that NZUs could be banked while international units had a limited life, participants surrendered only international units. The mix of ERUs (from industrialised countries, predominantly in Eastern Europe) and CERs (from developing countries) may largely reflect availability; prices were similar. From 2016, only NZUs can be surrendered, but New Zealand will need to find a new source of international mitigation that it can fund in order to meet international commitments. This could be achieved within or outside the ETS. ERUs come from arrangements that are unlikely to be repeated -full linkage with countries (e.g. Ukraine and Russia) with emissions caps/targets that are well above business as usual; CERs come from developing countries. While New Zealand is unlikely to accept these particular credits again, it may find another way to fund mitigation in developing countries and take credit for some of that mitigation.
The rise of the bank
There have been three basic motivations for banking units. First, foresters (and other companies) who know they will face liabilities in future can bank units to manage price risk.
Second, those who believe that the emissions price will rise will bank units. Both of these motivations will be relevant for the ETS in the future. Third, the ability to surrender cheap international units while NZUs were still allocated to participants (both for forestry removals and free allocation to emissions-intensive trade-exposed industries) led to massive banking of NZUs -this was a specific feature of one period of the NZ ETS. Essentially the government allocated a large volume of units at very low price; the bank is currently sufficient to cover more than three years of gross emissions for the ETS sectors (without the one-for-two scheme). few trades that were occurring were at prices of around $20. Numan-Parsons et al. (2011) reported that "the majority of firms surveyed are intending to pay emissions prices rather than seek to reduce their emissions". 
Forestry sector responses
The forestry sector has been in the ETS the longest and, at initial ETS prices, faced a high incentive to change behaviour. This is the sector therefore in which we are mostly likely to observe responses to ETS. We show some evidence around forestry sector behaviour as an illustration of responses, and non-responses to ETS so far. 21
Afforestation (non) responses
Afforestation was projected by three separate sources 22 to rise by around 20,000 hectares per year with a stable emissions price of $25. Interviews in 2010 suggested that uncertainty about policy and prices was inhibiting forestry investment 23 and the collapse in emissions prices from mid-2011 bore out forestry investors' fears. 21 For more detail see Kerr, Carver, and Dawson (2016) . 22 Manley and Maclaren (2009); Kerr et al. (2012) and Adams and Turner (2012) . 23 Karpas and Kerr (2011 
Deforestation responses to ETS
During the period from 2008 to 2014, dairy prices and dairy profitability were rising. This created increasing pressure to convert cleared land (or even young forest) to dairy. At the same time pre-1990 forest was being harvested -however landowners had not necessarily yet decided whether to replant. If landowners do not replant within three years they are required to pay a deforestation liability. even modest emissions prices may be sufficient to deter deforestation, though they may not be necessary. It will remain difficult to identify the effect of the ETS itself.
Participation and windfall gains in forestry
Many post-1989 foresters who were eligible to receive credits have not participated in the ETS.
Of 659,332 hectares of eligible land, only 277,212 hectares are registered (Environmental Protection Authority 2015b). This should not be surprising: because most post-1989 forests were planted before 1998, only large foresters were able to sell credits without risk that prices would be high when they needed to harvest and face liabilities. Large foresters with forests of varied age classes are more likely to be able to repay liabilities on harvest with new credits from sequestration from younger forests. The red line in Figure 7 indicates the level of credits that can be sold from a new forest without later needing to purchase credits to meet liabilities. More sophisticated emissions markets that allow small foresters to sell more credits without exposing themselves to price risk and higher emissions prices, could encourage more small foresters to enter the ETS and benefit from the incentive to extend rotation length. This observation of low gains to many foresters contrasts with concerns by some international and domestic observers that New Zealand's ETS was providing large windfall gains for foresters (and non-additional credits into the NZ ETS). Non-additionality may be more significant when post-1989 forests are harvested and replanted, or when timber prices are higher, but the present value of non-additional risk-free credits, valued at the time the ETS began, is likely to be low overall. Some large foresters have benefited and some small foresters benefited by selling units at the high prices early in the scheme and buying back later, but these latter gains were speculative gains from potentially risky choices.
Lessons learned from the NZ ETS
From an examination of the last decade of emissions trading policy development in New
Zealand, a number of observations emerge that offer insights into many of the design challenges facing NZ ETS policy makers today.
The lasting influence of policy precedents
The principle that in the absence of mitigation options, the agriculture sector should fund research on mitigation rather than paying for its biological emissions.
Sectors' expectations that were set in 2002 regarding their exposure to mitigation responsibility and cost under government mitigation policy continue to shape the NZ ETS today.
It is important to be aware of those expectations and continue to test their relevance as the broader context evolves.
7.2
The importance of defining the system's purpose
Since it ratified the Kyoto Protocol, New Zealand has managed its international obligations to reduce emissions as "responsibility targets" which can be met through both domestic mitigation and investment in overseas mitigation through the carbon market. The NZ ETS was conceived as an instrument that would expose the domestic economy to the international emission price and allow market participants to make economically efficient decisions on whether to reduce their own emissions or invest in mitigation elsewhere. It was also intended to devolve the purchasing of overseas units for Kyoto compliance from the government to market participants. It was not designed to constrain domestic emissions. The reasoning was that as long as New Zealand's production was highly efficient under an emission price, then we could allow our domestic emissions to rise (and in the case of harvesting, to fluctuate cyclically) while still contributing to net global mitigation through the carbon market. If New Zealand simply cut production to reduce emissions, then the equivalent demand would be met by less efficient and uncapped producers, raising global emissions overall (referred to as leakage). "…to support and encourage global efforts to reduce GHG emissions by:
• reducing New Zealand's net emissions below business-as-usual levels; and
• complying with our international obligations, including our Kyoto Protocol obligations; while maintaining economic flexibility, equity, and environmental integrity at least cost in the long term."
The 2008 legislation provided for a simplified purpose with dual outcomes: a greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme that "supports and encourages global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by assisting New Zealand to meet its international obligations under the Convention and the Protocol, and by reducing New Zealand's net emissions below business-asusual levels." This purpose was intended to ensure the system could endure even in the absence of future Kyoto commitment periods.
Although the legislative purpose does not favour one outcome over the other or refer to leastcost compliance, prioritising least-cost compliance with international obligations over domestic emission reductions has remained firmly embedded in the policy framework of the NZ ETS. This underpinned repeated decisions from 2008 through mid-2015 to place no quantity limits on the use of overseas Kyoto units for NZ ETS compliance, allowing domestic emission prices to fall below NZ$1 per tonne for a period of time. In March 2012, Cabinet confirmed its three objectives for the NZ ETS were to "help New Zealand to deliver its 'fair share' of international action to reduce emissions, including meeting any international obligations; deliver emission reductions in the most cost effective manner; and support efforts to maximise the long term economic resilience of the New Zealand economy at least cost" (New Zealand Cabinet 2012). The legislative purpose of the NZ ETS was not amended to reflect this restatement of the system's objectives, but they did influence Cabinet decisions throughout the process of amendment.
When officials evaluated the NZ ETS in preparation for the 2016 review, they found no evidence that sectors other than forestry had reduced their own emissions in response to the NZ ETS over the period [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . Participants primarily met their obligations by purchasing Kyoto units at very low cost. From a strict interpretation of the legislation, officials were still able to conclude that the system had fulfilled its stated purpose. It is interesting that in their intervention logic for the 2016 evaluation, officials revived the desired outcome from 2007 to "maintain environmental integrity, equity and economic efficiency, at least cost, in the long run" (Ministry for the Environment 2016).
Since the NZ ETS was developed, the framing of global mitigation objectives has shifted to emphasise the need to transition to net zero emissions of long-lived GHGs in order to achieve the two-degree-temperature-reduction goal. This may have implications for the future design and operation of the NZ ETS in the context of supporting domestic decarbonisation.
7.3
The significant impact of policy uncertainty Participants in the NZ ETS have been heavily impacted by policy uncertainty driven by both international and domestic factors. Slow progress in the international climate change negotiations contributed to uncertainty about long-term global mitigation ambition and the ongoing use of carbon market mechanisms for achieving future targets. The legislation for the NZ ETS was passed without cross-party consensus within weeks of an election, and it spent much of its 'childhood' under review and amendment driven by rushed policy-making processes that pushed through changes despite opposition.
Both practical experience and research suggest that policy volatility can be harder to manage -and more important for long-term investment -than price volatility (for example, see Gilbert et al. [2014] ). Policy-driven uncertainty about future emission prices reduces mitigation investment.
The challenges of linking to international markets
The early experience of New Zealand and other countries with linking ETSs has identified some of the potential pitfalls. Linking can introduce uncertainty over unit supply and price management, expose linked schemes to political uncertainty and environmental integrity risks across jurisdictions, and raise sovereignty concerns over future policy making. Linking also serves as a vehicle for wealth transfers to other countries, which can be politically unpopular.
Experience suggests that future linking should be conducted within constraints for managing risks to unit supply, prices and environmental integrity and it may be preferable to reserve linking for systems that are fully established and functioning effectively.
The value of simplicity and transparency
On the basis of internal assessment and interviews with participants during their 2016 evaluation, officials concluded that the NZ ETS operational systems were generally functioning well. Participants' experiences were somewhat variable; among the more prominent concerns reported were high initial costs for NZ ETS administration, the amount of paperwork required and unclear information from the government (Ministry for the Environment 2016). The simplicity of the system (outside of forestry) has made it easy to operate and participate in. The combination of simplicity and public access to information also has also made the system relatively transparent. The government publicly releases the following information held in the New Zealand Emission Unit Register: monthly data on aggregated transactions, annual data on surrenders and emissions, a list of participants and their holdings, a list of recipients of free allocation, the rate of free allocation for their activity and aggregate free allocation by year, data on removal units, and data on international units coming into (and out of) the register. The government also releases regular forecasts of New Zealand's net position under international agreements, and annual inventory updates on New Zealand's gross and net emissions and associated activity data. Emission price information is available in real time from brokers.
Despite all this useful information, it is still difficult for officials, NZ ETS participants or other stakeholders to understand and forecast demand and supply in the NZ ETS. This makes it impossible to predict the emissions price based on fundamentals. This difficulty has been driven partly by the absence of a cap and changing rules over access to international units, and partly because the relationship between emissions under the ETS and total New Zealand emissions is unclear, especially since the government's 2012 decision to remove the requirement that every NZU be backed by a Kyoto unit held in a Crown account. Now that New Zealand is operating a domestic-only system, this uncertainty drives the emission price which can only be determined by market expectations about future policy stringency. That makes the domestic emission price a useful visible measure of market expectations about politics but tells nothing about the difficulty or otherwise of mitigation and has limited value as a long-term price signal.
One other frequently misunderstood implication of the current separation between New Zealand's target and the NZ ETS is that if individuals, environmental groups or companies cancel an NZU for altruistic or social responsibility reasons, they may believe that by doing so they are reducing global emissions but this is not likely to be the case under current conditions. As long NZUs are a liability to the government, not an asset they can use for international compliance.
Linkages between the ETS and government's net position accounting
The government's approach to accounting for its liabilities and assets associated with its Going forward it would be useful to clarify how the government will value its commitment for the period 2021-2030 under the Paris Agreement, and the surplus Kyoto units which the government is carrying forward and intending to use in the future. It could be useful to consider how to most appropriately align methods for accounting for the government's net position under the NZ ETS and its international obligations.
Conclusion
The NZ ETS design was calibrated to operate in a world which no longer exists, one where the system could be nested within a global cap on emissions and linked to other sources of unit supply managed under an international framework for ensuring environmental integrity.
Fundamentally, the NZ ETS offers a sound foundation for supporting New Zealand's contribution to global mitigation effort. However, for the potential environmental, economic and social benefits of the NZ ETS to be realised, changes are needed. These relate not just to its architecture but also to its underlying objectives and its relationship with other policies and the evolving international carbon market. Predictable processes for change that help to provide longer-term policy certainty will support mitigation investment in alignment with the transition toward net zero emissions of long-lived GHGs.
